Labour Market Collusion in Sport: Competition Law Risks

A. Enforcement in the UK and the EU: An Ongoing Examination

1. Labour market cartel: the European Commission breaks new ground

In June 2025, the European Commission (EC) fined food delivery companies Delivery Hero and Glovo over €329 million for engaging in anti-competitive coordination. The competitors participated in a cartel that included agreements (i) not to poach each other’s employees; (ii) to exchange commercially sensitive information; and (iii) to allocate geographic markets.

This is a watershed moment: the EC’s first-ever labour market cartel decision, and the first time it fined parties for a no-poach agreement under Article 101 TFEU.

While some of this conduct was initially rationalised by Delivery Hero’s minority investment in Glovo, the EC made clear that:

• cross-ownership does not excuse collusion;
• labour is a competitive input like any other; and
• these types of no-poach agreements result in fewer job opportunities for employees, and are a form of purchasing cartel.

Takeaway: While this case was not centred on the sport sector, the learnings are universally applicable. Employers must compete for talent; they must not collude to limit the number and quality of opportunities for workers.

2. Sports broadcasting fines: beware the dangers of information-sharing

In March 2025, the UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) fined four of the UK's biggest sports broadcasters – BBC, ITV, BT and IMG – a combined £4.2 million for sharing sensitive pay information about freelance workers such as camera operators and sound technicians.

The companies exchanged details of day rates, pay increases, and negotiation strategies. Internal communications revealed clear anticompetitive intent, including statements that they had “no intention of getting into a bidding war”.

This conduct was found to reduce pay competition, suppressing earnings for freelancers across football, rugby and other high-profile broadcasts.

Takeaway: Even informal or one-off discussions between competitors about pay levels can amount to a competition law infringement.

3. AG Emiliou in CD Tondela: a nuanced view in Sport

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has not been blind to the complexity of labour agreements in sport. In CD Tondela v AdC, the Court is considering a no-poach agreement among Portuguese football clubs during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The agreement prevented clubs from hiring players who had unilaterally terminated their contracts due to COVID-related disruptions. While AG Emiliou noted in his May 2025 Opinion that no-poach agreements are typically anticompetitive by object, he proposed a more contextual analysis on the facts.

Because the agreement sought to preserve the integrity and fairness of the competition, and was limited in scope and duration, he concluded that (i) the agreement was not restrictive by object; and (ii) it could fall to be assessed under the Meca-Medina doctrine, which permits otherwise restrictive sporting rules if they are shown to be necessary and proportionate to the pursuit of legitimate sporting objectives.

Takeaway: Context and proportionality matter – but only in exceptional, well-justified circumstances. Sporting bodies must still approach no-poach arrangements with extreme caution.

4. Estonian football: Is “good practice” good enough?

The Estonian competition authority is reportedly investigating alleged cartel conduct involving proposed “good practice” agreements between football clubs. These agreements reportedly restricted the movement of youth players and coaching staff between clubs.

Whistleblower testimony alleges that Aivar Pohlak, current president of the Estonian Football Association and then-representative of FC Flora, Estonia’s most decorated football club, offered such agreements to other clubs. The proposed measures would require clubs to seek permission from each other before hiring staff or accepting players, and even include clauses barring contact with employees unless first reported to the other club.

It is argued that as a result of such a cartel, players and staff would be unable to move freely between clubs, and clubs wouldn't be able to compete openly for talent.

Takeaway: Even “soft” or informal proposals to coordinate HR decisions can trigger an investigation.

B. Practical Risks and Lessons

1. Labour is a competitive input. Just like player transfers and media rights, labour (including coaching staff, technical teams, and freelancers) is part of the competitive process. Suppressing worker movement or compensation can violate competition rules, even if the rationale seems "fair" or traditional.
2. Intent is not a shield. Even if an agreement is well-intentioned (e.g., preserving competition integrity during COVID), it can still be illegal unless it is clearly necessary, narrowly tailored, and temporary.
3. Information sharing = risk. Conversations between rivals – whether in person, by email, or through industry bodies – about wages, hiring policies, or freelancer rates should be treated as high-risk. "Benchmarking" can easily become price signalling.
4. Informal agreements are in scope. Verbal understandings, gentlemen’s agreements, or non-binding “frameworks” can still constitute collusion. Courts and authorities will look at substance over form.
5. Criminal and financial liability. Penalties can be severe. The Estonian case may be pursued under criminal law. In the UK and EU, fines are substantial, and reputational damage arguably even greater.
   

Final Word

In the world of sport, where tight networks and overlapping roles are common, it's not uncommon for organisations to underestimate the legal risk of HR coordination. But as these cases show, competition law applies just as rigorously in the boardroom as it does on the pitch.

Before entering into such agreements or understandings, stop and consider the impact. What might seem like good governance, stability, or pragmatism can quickly become a costly legal quagmire.